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Introduction
It is a highly stylized fact that entrepreneurial activity is central to economies, because start-ups contribute substantially to improvements and innovations in goods, processes, and applications (see, among others, Schumpeter, 1942; Baumol, 1968) . For this reason, politicians try to foster entrepreneurial activity (e.g., German support programmes 1 or White House launches the "Startup America" Initiative 2 ) to boost economic development and to reduce unemployment. In this line, Audretsch and Thurik (2000) conclude that an increase in the number of entrepreneurs lowers the rate of unemployment. Although the literature suggests rather weak employment effects of subsidized start-ups (Link and Scott, 2012; Caliendo et al., 2012) , politicians might tend to overemphasize the direct employment effects of start-ups and discuss how to foster entrepreneurship.
Also the core literature about the economic contribution of entrepreneurship focuses on employment effects. Wong et al. (2005) show in their literature survey that newly formed businesses create a significant number of new jobs. Furthermore, the international literature frequently refers to "gazelles", which are defined as companies that experience a high rate of growth in a very short time (Cognetics, 2000) . Studies on gazelles frequently refer to firm growth in terms of employment. Such firms are shown to be important because they generate a significant number of new jobs (Storey, 1994) . However, the pure focus on fast-growing enterprises in terms of employment in the short run is myopic, as Fritsch and Weyh (2006) or Schindele and Weyh (2011) find that entrepreneurs in (West) Germany initially increase the number of employees, which is later followed by a decrease in the number of employees. Fritsch and Weyh (2006, p. 256) conclude that "strong employment growth of start-up cohorts is definitely not a general trend." The decline of employment in later years might not necessarily be due to reorganization and optimization of different 1 April, 4 2014: http://www.existenzgruender.de/englisch/index.php 2 April, 4 2014: http://www.whitehouse.gov/startup-america-fact-sheet processes. In fact, Schindele and Weyh (2011) suggest that older firms face a comparatively high risk of failure.
In contrast to the papers listed above, we examine sales of new firms and the corresponding contribution to total sales in Germany. This determinant does not suffer medium-or long-term inferences, but is an adequate indicator of current economic prosperity introduced by newly founded firms. Our findings suggest that new firm formation has low impact on total sales in Germany. Each year, a maximum of one percent of total sales in Germany can be attributed to new firms although each eleventh firm is a start-up.
"In fact, despite the evidence, we still lack sufficiently firm evidence of positive spillovers from entrepreneurship" (Parker, 2005, p. 37) . Here, we also consider indirect economic effects of new firm formation on incumbents. The seminal work of Acemoglu et al. (2006) shows that economies close to the technology frontier face higher relative demand for innovation (when compared to imitation) to foster growth. Their model proposes that entrepreneurs are more innovative than imitative, which is the main reason why economies at the technological frontier rely more on an innovation-based strategy, which are characterized by entrepreneurship and young firms. These innovative entrepreneurs in turn affect the established firms by creation of new products and the development of new markets. Aghion et al. (2009) present results on the effect of new entries into the market and the reaction of incumbents with respect to productivity and innovation. Indirect employment effects of new businesses on incumbents are addressed in Fritsch and Noseleit (2013b,a) . Fritsch and Noseleit (2013a) suggest that competition between new businesses and incumbent enforce indirect employment effects. Fritsch and Noseleit (2013b) 
Data
The consecutive analysis utilizes the German Umsatzsteuerpanel, which is provided by the Federal Statistical Office. It is based on the data from the Umsatzsteuerstatistik (Voranmeldung) of the Federal Statistical Office, which are surveyed from 1996 onwards. It contains annual information on all firms that submit a turnover tax pre-registration. Based on the cross-sectional data of the Umsatzsteuerstatistik, the Federal Statistical Office produces panel data -the Umsatzsteuerpanel -that also allow for longitudinal analysis. The panel structure relies on highly reliable identifiers such as the tax ID and the turnover tax identifier (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009, p. 737) . Further details are presented in Vogel and Dittrich (2008) . The underlying data is restricted to the period from 2001 to 2009. A further restriction is that the minimum yearly turnover must exceed 16,617 Euro, which implies that firms with lower turnover are not surveyed in the data. 4 Firms that are exempt from submitting this form are also missing. In addition, firms with mostly tax-free turnover are not surveyed. The data offer detailed information on turnover tax-related indicators and on sectors. 5 We consider the sectors "manufacturing industry", "distribution", "services for firms", and "other services" (see Schneck and May-Strobl, 2013 years (t + p with p ≥ 2). We restrict our sample to firms that are observed either once or continuously over time. Firms with discontinuous observations over time (in either turnover or DIT) are dropped from the analysis. Such behavior might be due to business breaks or other reasons, such as part-time self-employment, which might lead to an annual turnover below the above mentioned thresholds. Note that an exit in our data set might not necessarily indicate business failure, but might be a due to a change in the legal form of the organization or a regional transfer of business. In such cases, the ID changes, and we incorrectly identify exits because of a change in the tax ID or the turnover tax identifier. in our cohort analysis (see Table 2 ).
To calculate the value added of entrepreneurs (defined as entrants into the Umsatzsteuerpanel ), we calculate our measure in analogy to the one applied in Brouwer et al. (2005) .
Specifically, we utilize information on the turnover and on the DIT of firm i in period t.
with intermediate consumption it = DIT it I(turnover tax rate) t I(turnover tax rate) t = 0.16 for t= [2001; 2006] I(turnover tax rate) t = 0.19 for t= [2007; 2009] (2)
Note that the German tax system considers a full turnover tax rate and a reduced turnover tax rate. The reduced turnover tax rate is mainly applied for groceries, print media, and art (also see Umsatzsteuergesetz §12). We are not able to separate the full tax rate from the reduced one with our data. For this reason, we assume the full turnover tax rate for all inputs and, thus, apply this rate for calculation of intermediate consumption in equation 2.
11
10 Information regarding employment in the firms is not surveyed in the original data. It is possible, however, to match information on the number of employees to the original data. For this purpose the Unternehmensregister (see Sturm and Tümmler, 2006) that contains information on the number of employees covered by social security is matched with the Umsatzsteuerpanel (see Vogel et al., 2009) . The matching of the Unternehmensregister and the Umsatzsteuerstatistik is conducted via the unique tax identifier. 11 Henceforth, the words input and intermediate consumption are used as synonyms.
Results
The number of observations by cohort and firm-specific age are presented in Table 2 . We find no general trend towards more or less new firm formation in our data because in 2002 and in 2008 almost the same number of firms are founded. About one in five of all new microenterprises leave the sample after the start-up period. Four years after entering the market, about half of all firms remain in the sample.
Insert Table 2 about here In Table 3 , we show whether surviving firms differ in certain characteristics from the firms that drop out after the start-up period. At first, it might be hypothesized that entrepreneurs who fail early might be necessity entrepreneurs (Block and Sandner, 2009 ).
Furthermore, some individuals might tend to send the signal to potential employers that they are not formally unemployed. These individuals are presumed to be more likely to search for new jobs instead of planning self-employment in the long run. For this reason, we expect that those firms invest less capital. Application of a t-test confirms this hypothesis.
Workers who survive the initial period invest, on average, almost 63,000 Euro more to set up their business (see Table 3 ).
Insert Table 3 about here   Table 3 also adverts to differences in economic situation. The average turnover of surviving firms is significantly higher than in exiting firms. We explain this by necessity entrepreneurship and the individual propensity to look for a job in paid employment. Inputs are also lower in firms that leave the sample after one single year, which also might be viewed as a hint to necessity entrepreneurship. With respect to value added, we find the opposite. Firms that survive generate significantly less value added than do firms that are not observed one period later. This might be due to investments of entrepreneurs that might pay off in the future. For this reason, opportunity entrepreneurship and long-term investments are indicated.
As survival is not the only adequate measure for success of entrepreneurs (Noll and Wießner, 2011) , our cohort analysis turns the focus to turnover.
12 Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for turnover of microenterprises. An average newly founded microenterprise in our data generates turnover of more than 100,000 Euro, while the median suggests that half of all newly founded microenterprises achieve turnover between 39,743 and 46,013
Euro in their start-up period. In fact, more than 75% of all new ventures exhibit less than average turnover in the period of start-up, which suggests that the distribution is positively skewed. Superstar theory (Rosen, 1981) might provide an explanation for this pattern. A few entrepreneurial 'superstars' (less than 25% of the population) heavily influence mean turnover.
13
Insert Table 4 about here   Table 4 reveals a positively skewed distribution for established firms (age≥1). Turnover of firms below the third quartile is lower than the mean across all cohorts and firm age.
The ninth percentile, in turn, always exceeds the mean of turnover across cohorts and age.
With respect to heterogeneity in turnover across newly founded enterprises, cohorts 2002
and 2003 seem to consist of a heterogeneous group of entrepreneurs because their standard deviations are highest in the start-up period. New firms are also considerably unequal with respect to turnover. The ratio between the 95% and the 5% percentile exceeds 20 in the period of entry and is even higher in later years.
We also contribute to the literature on economic prosperity and, thus, present total turnover in Table 5 . Newly founded microenterprises generate turnover between 27.6 and 12 Note that survival is an indirect success measure in this particular data set because firms exceed a turnover-specific threshold. Detailed descriptions of entrepreneurial success, however, cannot be made. 13 According to our definition, the highest possible turnover of newly founded microenterprises is 2,000,000
Euro in period 0.
31.3 billion Euro in the period of start-up. In the succeeding period, total turnover exceeds that in the start-up period, although only four in five firms survive. In fact, total turnover substantially grows in early years. Across cohorts, total turnover increases in most con- crisis and "the unprecedented fall in exports" (Stiglitz, 2009, p. 2), whereas Germany is being considered as export-oriented country. In this line Möller (2010) suggests that the export-orientated sectors were mainly affected. In total, the accumulated turnover across all cohorts and years amounts to 1,524 billion Euro.
Insert Table 5 about here
In order to assess the economic importance of new ventures, we need to show their importance in relation to total turnover of all firms in Germany that submit a turnover tax pre-registration. Table 6 shows that the contribution of newly founded microenterprises is comparatively small in relative terms. Less than one percent of total turnover is con- Euro in 2009 (also see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011, p. 25) . In contradiction, they con-tribute only 13.6997% of total turnover, which strikingly illustrates that only few very large companies create significant turnover in Germany.
Insert Table 6 about here
In a next step, we examine the indirect effects of new business formation in Table 7 . The
Table presents the amount of money that is needed to set up and to carry on businesses.
In most cases, we can reasonably expect that these products and services are bought from incumbents. In total, new business formation creates a total demand of 1,005 billion Euro at established firms. When compared to total sales, each Euro of sales at new or young firms in our sample is transformed to 66 Cent of products and services bought from other firms.
Insert Table 7 about here   Table 7 also refers to the share of total inputs with respect to total sales by cohort and age.
Especially in the period of start-up, the need for products and services is relatively high.
In fact, 85 to 95% of each Euro of sales is needed to set up the firm. In the consecutive periods, the need for inputs decreases to about 65 percent. Exits as well as the singular nature of some start-up investments might explain this decrease. Two years after the startup, about 60 to 63 Cent of one Euro of sales is needed to buy products and services from other firms. although the number of newly founded enterprises is not basically different (see Table 2 ). Linear firm-specific fixed-effects approaches might also be applied to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Here, we prefer linear regression because this procedure allows for the inclusion of time invariant variables, such as sector. In addition, note that logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable value added leads to a loss of observations because firms with negative value added must be excluded. 16 The figures display the results for cohort 2002, but the pictures are similar for other cohorts. Positive cohort dummy variables lead to a parallel upward shift, while a negative coefficient leads to a downward shift of the sectoral lines. Dummy variables for the years remain unconsidered. Figure 1 shows that sales are highest in the manufacturing industry in all periods. The second highest sales are achieved in the sector distribution, followed by firm-related services.
In the period of entry, the average need for inputs is highest in the manufacturing industry, followed by the services for firms sector (see Figure 2) . With increasing age, the need for inputs grows fastest in the distribution sector. Six years after the start-up, the average cost The survival of firms in our data set is in line with other studies, because most drop-outs are identified in the early stages of the firm history (for Germany, see Rink et al., 2013) . About 20% to 25% leave the sample immediately after the start-up period. The typical new venture seems to exit the sample after about four to five years. In fact, each second firm drops out of our sample within this period. We also show that the share of turnover of new business formation with respect to total turnover in Germany is fairly low although each eleventh firm in Germany is a newly founded one. In 2009 each third firm was a young firm that was founded between 2002 and 2009, but the share of turnover contributed by these firms amounted to less than 6.5%. This implies that the major part of current prosperity is not determined by new firms, but the replacement of old firms enforces modernization. For this reason, entrepreneurship can be expected to affect the future prosperity via modernization, competition, and improvements of products and services.
Our results on indirect monetary effects on incumbents suggest that start-up investments increase vitality of the incumbents. One Euro of sales at a newly founded firm is used to buy products and services from incumbents for about 85 to 95 Cent. This might explain why employment at incumbents is likely to increase in the period of entry of new firms (see Fritsch and Noseleit, 2013b) . In later periods, the need for products and services from incumbents decreases to about 60 Cent per Euro of sales. In total, the average need for inputs amounts to 66% of current turnover, while 34% remain in the new firm. The average cost for inputs, thus, exceeds average value added across all cohorts in all periods. This might explain why indirect effects of new businesses are quantitatively more important than the direct employment effects of new businesses (Fritsch and Noseleit, 2013b) .
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Tables included in the text
In parentheses: Percentage of newly founded firms compared to number of all firms.
Total turnover of entrepreneurs is presented in Table 5 . The number of entrepreneurs is shown in Table 2 . Sources: (July 16, 2013) http://www.ifm-bonn.org/fileadmin/data/redaktion/statistik/unternehmensgroessenstatistik/dokumente/Ums_KMU_2000-2010.pdf http://www.ifm-bonn.org/fileadmin/data/redaktion/statistik/unternehmensgroessenstatistik/dokumente/Unt_KMU_2000-2010.pdf
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